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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze several recent schemes for watermarking network flows that are based on splitting
the flow into timing intervals. We show that this approach creates time-dependent correlations that enable an attack that
combines multiple watermarked flows. Such an attack can easily be mounted in nearly all applications of network flow
watermarking, both in anonymous communication and stepping stone detection. The attack can be used to detect the
presence of a watermark, recover the secret parameters, and remove the watermark from a flow. The attack can be
effective even if different flows are marked with different values of a watermark.
We analyze the efficacy of our attack using a probabilistic model and a Markov-Modulated Poisson Process (MMPP) model
of interactive traffic. We also implement our attack and test it using both synthetic and real-world traces, showing that
our attack is effective with as few as 10 watermarked flows. Finally, we propose possible countermeasures to defeat the
multi-flow attack.
Index Terms—Watermarking, stepping stones, anonymous networks, network flow analysis.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Traffic analysis is the practice of inferring sensitive
information from communication patterns. Traffic
analysis has been particularly studied in the con-
text of anonymous communication systems, where
features such as packet timings, sizes, and counts
can be used to link two flows and break anonymity
guarantees [1], [2]. Traffic analysis is also sometimes
used in intrusion detection, for example, to detect
the presence of stepping stones within an enter-
prise [3].
Recently, there has been a growing interest in
the use of watermarking to aid traffic analysis [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. In this case traffic pat-
terns of a flow (usually packet timings) are actively
modified to contain a special pattern. If the same
pattern is later found on another flow, the two are
easily linked. Watermarking significantly reduces
the computation and communication costs of traffic
analysis, and may also lead to more precise detec-
tion with fewer false positives [9]. Watermarking
has been applied to both the problems of attacking
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anonymity systems [5], [7], [8] and detecting step-
ping stones [4], [6].
In both contexts, many flows must be water-
marked in order to learn new information. In our
work, we consider whether an attacker1 can learn
enough information to defeat the watermark by
observing multiple watermarked flows [11]. We
apply this multi-flow threat model to the latest gen-
eration of interval-based watermarks [6], [7], [8]. These
watermarks subdivide the flow to be marked into
discrete time intervals and perform transformative
operations on an entire interval of packets. This
approach is more robust to packet losses, insertions,
and repacketization, than previous approaches that
focused on individual packets [4], [5], because the
time intervals allow the watermarker and detector
to retain synchronization. However, the same syn-
chronization property can be exploited by attackers
by “lining up” multiple watermarked flows and
observing the transformations that were inserted.
We show through experiments that the interval-
based watermark schemes are completely vulnera-
ble to an attacker who can collect a small number of
watermarked flows—about 10. This is sufficient to
not only detect that a watermark is indeed present,
1. We use “attacker” here to refer to someone attacking the
watermarking scheme; in the case where watermarks themselves
are used by attackers, these will be the “counter-attackers.”
2but also to recover the secret parameters of the
watermark scheme and to be able to remove the
watermark at a low cost. Furthermore, our attack
works even if different watermarked flows contain
different embedded “messages” with only about
twice the number of watermarked flows necessary.
We also analytically estimate the false-positive rates
for our attack and find them to be very low.
We also consider some countermeasures to such
attacks. We show that by using multiple “keys”
(time interval assignments) to watermark differ-
ent flows, it is possible to defeat our attack. This
countermeasure comes at a cost of higher compu-
tation overhead at the detector and a higher rate of
false positives. However, this increased cost is only
linear, whereas the increased cost of the attacker
is superexponential, thus providing an effective
defense.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the setting for our attack and
reviews the three schemes considered in this paper.
Section 3 describes the theoretical foundation for
our attack, and Section 4 implements the attack. We
discuss potential countermeasures to the attack in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
We first describe the setting of our attack in a bit
more detail and then review the essential details of
the watermarking schemes we analyze.
2.1 Network Flow Watermarking
The setting for network flow watermarking is sim-
ilar to that of other digital media watermarks (and
in fact uses similar techniques). The general model,
as shown in Figure 1, involves a network flow
passing through a watermarking point (typically a
router of some sort) which transforms or distorts
the flow in some way (typically by modifying
packet timings by adding artificial delays in for-
warding). In the general setting, the watermarker
has a secret key and uses it to encode a message in
the traffic characteristics.
After watermarking, the flow undergoes some
natural or intentional distortion. Natural distortion
can take the form of delays at intermediate routers
(or rather, variability of delays, i.e., jitter), but
may also include dropped or retransmitted packets,
repacketization, and other changes. In addition, an
attacker may intentionally distort traffic character-
istics in order to prevent the watermark from being
recovered.
Watermarker Distortion Detectorflow
key
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Fig. 1. Network Flow Watermarking
The distorted flow finally arrives at a detection
point. The detector shares the secret key and uses it
to extract the message encoded in the watermark.
A good watermark will allow reliable recovery of
the message from the watermarked flow despite the
intermediate distortion.
In network flow watermarks, the message compo-
nent of the watermark may be used in two ways.
First, all watermarked flows may be marked with
a single message. In this case, the detector’s main
goal is to decide whether the watermark is present
or not by checking whether the decoded message
is the correct one. Alternately, different flows may
have a different message embedded, so that when
a watermarked flow is detected, it can be linked
with a particular marked flow. This comes at a cost
of less reliable detection, since the single-message
context creates more opportunities to detect errors.
Our attacks are designed to work in both single-
message and multiple-message contexts.
2.2 Watermarks in Anonymous Systems
At a very high level, an anonymous system maps
a number of input flows to a number of output
flows while hiding the relationship between them.
The internal operation can be implemented by a
mix network [12], onion routing [13], or a simple
proxy [14]. The goal of an attacker, then, is to link an
incoming flow to an outgoing flow (or vice versa).
A watermark can be used to defeat anonymity
protection in low-latency anonymous systems by
marking certain input flows and watching for
marks on the output flows. For example, a ma-
licious website might insert a watermark on all
flows from the site to the anonymizing system. A
cooperating attacker who can eavesdrop on the link
between a user and the anonymous system can then
determine if the user is browsing the site or not.
Similarly, a compromised entry router in Tor [15]
can watermark all of its flows, and cooperating exit
routers or websites can detect this watermark.
Note that this does not enable a fundamentally
new attack on low-latency anonymous systems: it
has been long known [13] that if an attacker can
3observe a flow at two points, he can determine
if the flow is the same, unless cover traffic is
used. (In fact, deployed low-latency systems such
as Onion Routing [13], Freedom [16], Tor [15],
and AN.ON [17] have all opted to forego cover
traffic due to it being expensive, hoping instead
that it will be difficult for an attacker to observe
a significant fraction of incoming and outgoing
flows.) However, watermarking makes the attack
much more efficient. With passive traffic analysis,
if one attacker observes n input flows and another
observes m output flows, the attack will require
O(n) communication between the attackers and
O(nm) computation, as one attacker must transmit
characteristics of all n flows to the other, and then
each output flow must be matched against each
input flow. With watermarking, on the other hand,
no communication needs to take place between the
two attackers after they have established a shared
secret key, and the computation cost is O(n) and
O(m) at the watermarker and detector respectively,
as the watermarker marks each input flow and the
detector checks each output flow for the presence
of a mark.
Multi-Flow Attack (MFA): In the above ex-
amples, a website, or an input router, will in-
sert the watermark into all the input flows going
through them. Therefore, it will be possible for the
anonymous system to obtain multiple watermarked
flows. These flows can then be used to recover the
secret key and then remove the watermarks from
subsequent flows, using the techniques we describe
below. Our techniques are low-cost, requiring a
small number of watermarked flows and modest
computation, so it is easy to check whether wa-
termarking is being applied by a given website or
router by aggregating its flows.
The only context where our attack does not ap-
ply is in a traffic confirmation attack. In this case,
an attacker already has a strong suspicion that a
particular input flow corresponds to a particular
output flow, and therefore need only watermark a
single flow. Traffic confirmation attacks are a more
rare use of traffic analysis, since they only con-
firm existing suspicions, rather than revealing new
linkages between flows. Furthermore, the efficiency
gains of watermarks are not beneficial in this case,
since n = m = 1. Therefore, our attack will apply
to the vast majority of practical uses of watermarks
in anonymous systems.
2.3 Watermarks in Stepping Stones
A stepping stone is a host that is used to relay traffic
through an enterprise network to another remote
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Fig. 2. Stepping stone detection architecture.
destination, in order to hide the true origin of the
flow. To detect such hosts, an enterprise must be
able to link an incoming flow to the relayed out-
going flow. The situation is therefore very similar
to an anonymous communication system, with n
flows entering the enterprise and m flows leaving.
Once again, this task may be accomplished by
passive traffic analysis [3], [18], [19], [20], but wa-
termarks make such detection much more efficient.
Passive techniques will require O(nm) computation
and potentially O(n) communication, if there are
multiple border routers through which traffic can
enter or leave the enterprise. With watermarking,
border routers for an enterprise will insert water-
marks on all incoming flows, and check for the
presence of the mark on all outgoing flows, as
shown in Figure 2, reducing the computation cost
to O(n) and O(m) for the incoming and outgoing
flows.
Multi-Flow Attack: Since all incoming flows
must be marked, an attacker in control of a compro-
mised host can simply generate multiple external
flows destined for that host (and not relay them),
and then collect the timing characteristics of the
flows as they arrive at the host to recover the secret
watermark key. Once this is accomplished, the key
can be used to remove watermarks from relayed
flows, thus defeating stepping stone detection.
2.4 Interval Centroid-based Watermarking
(ICBW)
We next review the scheme proposed by
Wang et al. [7]; for more details of the scheme as
well as some analysis we refer the reader to [7].
The scheme is based on dividing the stream into
intervals of equal lengths, using two parameters:
o, the offset of the first interval, and T , the length
of each interval. A subset of 2n of these intervals is
randomly selected which is subsequently randomly
divided into two further subsets A and B each
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Fig. 3. Insertion of watermark bit 0 by ICBW.
consisting of n = rl intervals. Each of the sets A
and B are randomly divided to l subsets denoted
by {Ai}
l
i=1 and {Bi}
l
i=1 each consisting of r
intervals. The i-th watermark bit is encoded using
the sets {Ai, Bi}. Therefore, a watermark of length
l can be embedded in the flow.
The watermarker and detector agree on the pa-
rameters o, T and use a pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) and a seed s to randomly select
and assign intervals for watermark insertion. To
keep the watermark transparent, all of these param-
eters are kept secret. Depending on whether the i-th
watermark bit is 1 or 0, the watermarker delays the
arrival times of the packets at the interval positions
in sets Ai or Bi respectively, by a maximum of a.
Figure 3 shows insertion of a watermark bit of 0.
As the result of this embedding scheme, the ex-
pected value of aggregate centroid, i.e., the average
of the arrival time of the packets modulo the length
of the interval T , in either the intervals Ai (when
watermark bit is 1) or Bi (when watermark bit is
0) corresponding to bit i is increased by a2 . The
expected difference between the aggregate centroid
of Ai and Bi now will be
a
2 when watermark bit is
1 or −a2 when watermark bit is 0.
The detector checks for the existence of the
watermark bits. The check on watermark bit i is
performed by testing whether the difference of the
aggregate centroid of packet arrival times in the
intervals Ai and Bi is closer to
a
2 or −
a
2 . If it is
closer to a2 , then the watermark bit is decoded as
1 and if it is closer to −a2 , the bit is declared a 0.
By focusing on the arrival times of many intervals
(r of them for each bit of watermark) rather than
individual packet timings, ICBW approach is robust
to repacketization, insertion of chaff, and mixing of
data flows. Network jitter can shift packets from
one interval into another, but the suggested param-
eters for a and T (350ms and 500ms respectively)
are large enough that few packets will be affected.
The secrecy of the interval positions Ai and Bi
make the mark difficult to detect or remove, as
it is hard to distinguish the patterns generated by
the mark from natural variation in traffic rates. We
show in Sections 3 and 4, however, that a simple
technique allows an observer to effectively recover
the watermark positions and values. This technique
is applicable to any watermarking scheme that
creates periods of clear or low traffic at specific parts
of the flows across many flows. Next, we briefly
describe Interval-Based Watermarking (IBW), a flow
watermarking scheme proposed by Pyun et al. [6]
to detect stepping stones. Our attacks also applies to
this scheme.
2.5 Interval-Based Watermarking
Similar to ICBW, the watermarking scheme of Pyun
et al. [6] manipulates the arrival times of the packets
over a set of preselected intervals. The watermark
embedding is achieved by manipulating the rates
of traffic in successive intervals. There are two
manipulations: an interval Ii may be cleared by
delaying all packets from interval Ii until interval
Ii+1, or it may be loaded by delaying all packets
from interval Ii−1 until interval Ii. A loaded inter-
val will therefore have twice the expected number
of packets, and a cleared one will have none. To
send a 0 bit in position i, the interval Ii is cleared
and Ii+1 is loaded; to send a 1, Ii is loaded and
Ii+1 is cleared. (Note that since clearing one interval
implicitly loads the next, it takes 3 intervals to send
a bit.)
The watermarker and detector agree on
the parameters o, T and a list of positions
S = {s1, . . . , sn}; all of these parameters are secret.
The watermarker encodes the watermark bits at
the interval positions si and the detector checks
for the existence of the watermark. The check
is performed by testing whether the data rate
in interval Isi differs from the rate in interval
Isi+1 by a factor exceeding a threshold; if it
does, then a 0 or 1 bit is considered detected.
By focusing on data rates rather than individual
packet timings, the interval-based approach is
robust to repacketization of data flows.
The detection process may generate false posi-
tives due to natural variation in packet rates, or
false negatives, as delays between the watermarker
and repacketization at the relay cause rates in inter-
vals to shift. To ensure reliable transmission, each
watermark bit is encoded in several positions in
the stream. Pyun et al. show that this technique
operates with very low false-positive and false-
negative rates.
52.6 Spread-Spectrum Watermarking
In DSSS watermarking technique of Yu et al. [8],
each bit of a length-n binary watermark is embed-
ded in an interval of length Ts. Hence the whole
watermark is inserted in some part of the flow of
length nTs. To embed a watermark bit 1, the rate
of the packets in its length-Ts designated interval
are manipulated according to a Pseudo-Noise (PN)
code. The PN code is a fast varying signal that
switched between +1 and −1; the duration of each
±1 period is Tc. In particular, Yu et al. choose a
length-7 PN code for their implementation. When
PN code is +1, the rate of flow remains intact, but
when PN code is −1, the rate of flow is decreased
for a duration of Tc. The flow rate is manipulated
by creating an interfering flow and relying on TCP
congestion control. (Note that this approach works
only with bulk flows where the sending rate is
indeed limited by TCP congestion control.) On the
other hand to embed a watermark bit 0, the flow
is manipulated using the complement of the PN
code.
The watermarker and detector agree on the pa-
rameter Ts, the watermark, and a Pseudo-Noise
code. The detector recovers the watermark by first
applying a high-pass filter to the received signal
and subsequently passing it through despreading
and a low-pass filter. The details of the detector’s
structure are inconsequential to our attack and the
interested reader is referred to [8].
Given that the watermark insertion technique in
DSSS reduces the flow rates over certain intervals
across all flows it is vulnerable to our averaging at-
tack, which is analysed in this paper. More recently,
Huang et al. suggest to change the DSSS watermark
to use different PN codes for watermarking differ-
ent flows in order to defend against the multi-flow
attack presented in this paper [21]. This approach
results in increasing the false positive rates of the
watermark detection as well as the complexity of
the watermark detector, since a detector needs to
correlate any received flow against all possible PN
codes that might have been used for watermarking;
unfortunately, this has not been considered by the
authors.
3 ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a probabilistic analysis
of our attack using a model for interactive traffic.
Though some watermarked traffic may consist of
non-interactive bulk transfer traffic, we will show
in Section 4.1 that interactive traffic presents a
more difficult case for our attack, and thus we
analyze it here. As DSSS watermarks work well
only against non-interactive traffic, our analysis
here applies only to IBW and ICBW, but as we
demonstrate experimentally, our attack will work
on DSSS watermarks as well.
3.1 Probabilistic Model of Interactive Traffic
We first present a model for interactive traffic, as
it is essential to our analysis. Let fm denote the
m-th flow in a pool of interactive traffic flows.
Given that the traffic might be encrypted, we do
not consider the content of the packets; likewise, the
sizes of packets representing keystrokes are likely
to be uniform. We thus consider only the arrival
time of the packets in the flow, allowing us to model
the flow as a point process.
Suppose we observed packet arrivals at times
t1 < t2 < · · · < tn in a fixed interval (0, τ ] such
that ti is the time the i-th packet arrived. The col-
lection of arrival times tm = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) specifies
a flow fi. Furthermore, we model the interactive
connection as a Markov-modulated Poisson process
(MMPP) [22], [23]. The set of possible states are
{0, 1}, where state 0 corresponds to user typing
characters and state 1 corresponds to periods of
silence. Figure 4 depicts this two-state MMPP.
Let X(t) denote the state of the process at time t.
When the process is at state 0, packet arrivals are
modeled as a renewal process; i.e., the interarrival
times are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). In case of interactive traffic flow this re-
newal process is often modeled as Poisson [19], [20].
The Poisson assumption means that the interarrival
time of the packets, denoted by θ, are exponentially
distributed. Hence its probability density function
(PDF) is given by:
fθ(t) = λe
−λ0t
where λ0 denotes the rate of the Poisson process.
When the process is in state 1, the arrivals are again
modeled as Poisson but with rate λ1 < λ0. Given
that state 1 corresponds to a period of silence (no
packet arrivals), as soon as a packet arrives the em-
bedded Markov chain transitions to state 0. There-
fore, the transition probabilities {Pij , i ≥ 0, j ≥ 0}
of the embedded Markov chain {Xn, n ≥ 0} are as
follows:
P00 + P01 = 1,
P01 = 1, P11 = 0 (1)
and the embedded Markov chain is defined by the
matrix: [
P00 1
1− P00 0
]
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Fig. 4. The embedded two-state Markov chain.
The steady state probabilities π0, π1 of the embed-
ded chain Xn are given by:[
π0
π1
]
=
[
P00 1
1− P00 0
] [
π0
π1
]
or:
π0 =
1
2− P00
, π1 =
1− P00
2− P00
The steady state probabilities P0, P1 of the Markov
process X(t) are given by ([23]):
Pi =
πi
λi∑
k
πk
λk
or:
P0 =
λ1
λ1 + (1− P00)λ0
, P1 =
(1 − P00)λ0
λ1 + (1− P00)λ0
(2)
The significance of the steady state probabilities of
(2) is that they capture the probability of each of the
states 0 and 1 at any given point in time. Recall that
ICBW encodes the watermark bits “1” or “0” by
delaying the arrival times of the packets at the set
of intervals Ai or Bi respectively and IBW encodes
the watermark bits “0” or “1” by transferring the
traffic of an interval of length T to some adjacent
interval. Therefore, they both creates periods of
time with no arrivals in the flow. This period for
ICBW is of length a and for IBW is of length T .
When the embedded Markov chain is in state i, we
can compute the probability of zero occurring in a
period of length ℓ starting at any given point as:
Pfi
m
(0; ℓ) = e−λiℓ (3)
since the waiting times are exponentially dis-
tributed and therefore memoryless.
In general given a flow fm generated from an
MMPP, from (3) probability of having a period of
length ℓ with no arrivals Pfm(0; ℓ) is:
Pfm(0; ℓ) = P0Pf0m(0; ℓ) + P1Pf1m(0; ℓ)
= P0e
−λ0ℓ + P1e
−λ1ℓ (4)
where the steady state probabilities {P0, P1} are
given by (2).
A good watermarking scheme requires that the
watermarked stream should not reveal any clues
of the presence of the watermark to unauthorized
observer. Therefore, it is desirable that Pfm(0; ℓ)
above should be reasonably large so that presence
of silent periods does not give away the watermark.
We next present parameters of our two-state MMPP
and show that for those parameters the watermark
indeed cannot be detected with observing a single
stream watermarked with ICBW or IBW. However,
we will show that if the attackers have access to
multiple copies of a marked signal, they can defeat
the two watermarking schemes both when multiple
flows are watermarked with the same key and
when they are watermarked using various keys.
3.2 Parameter Selection and Goodness of Fit
We estimated the parameters P00, λ0, and λ1 of
our MMPP model by using network traces of SSH
connections taken at a wireless access point in
our institution. For a trace, we first estimated the
underlying state of the embedded Markov chain
by choice of a threshold η. If the interarrival time
between two packets exceeded the threshold η, we
assumed that the process was in state 1 and if the
interarrival time between two packets was less than
the threshold η, we assumed that the user was
typing and therefore she/he was in state 0. Once
the states {Xn, n ≥ 0} of the underlying chain are
determined, by concatenation of the parts of the
interactive traffic that came from same underlying
state, we could extract two Poisson sub-flows with
rates λ0 and λ1 from the original flow.
Given that the expected number of arrivals of
a Poisson process distribution with parameter λ
in time interval (0, t] is λt, we estimated the rate
λ0 and λ1 by calculating the arrival rates of each
of the two extracted sub-flows. Parameter P00 was
estimated as the portion of the time the chain spent
at state 0. Our estimated values for the transition
probability P00 and the rates λ0 and λ1 were as
follows:
P00 = 0.96 λ0 = 5.6 λ1 = 0.57. (5)
To assess the goodness of fit of our MMPP with
parameters of (5), we used a quantile-quantile (q-
q) plot [24]. Using the theoretical CDF of the model,
the observations are mapped into values in interval
[0, 1]. If the underlying statistical model of the data
is consistent with the observations, the values ob-
tained from the mapping are uniformly distributed
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Fig. 5. Q-Q plot of Poisson and MMPP models with
our sample data.
in the interval [0, 1]. To assess the uniformity of
the mapped values or equivalently assessing the
goodness of the theoretical model an empirical CDF
of the mapped values is compared against the theo-
retical CDF of a uniform distribution which is a 45-
degree reference line. The closer the CDF to this ref-
erence line, the greater the evidence that the statis-
tical model captures the underlying phenomenon.
The q-q plot of Figure 5 for our model shows that
the MMPP model for the interactive traffic with
parameters (5) provides a good fit for the data and
significantly outperforms a simpler Poisson model,
or a Pareto distribution that has been previously
proposed to fit interactive traffic [25].
3.3 Multi-Flow Attack
Regardless of whether the ICBW or IBW wa-
termarking schemes are implemented using the
same message across all interactive flows or they
use multiple message for different flows, they are
subject to an averaging attack. This is because
both schemes embed watermarks by emptying the
same parts across various flows. Next, we will
explain our attack for both the single-message and
multiple-message watermarks.
3.3.1 Averaging Attack against Single-Message
Watermarks
When ICBW or IBW watermarking schemes are
implemented using the same message across all
interactive flows, if the attacker has access to k
watermarked flows, he can form an aggregate of
all the flows by taking the sorted union of all the
arrival times of packets in all flows. We denote
this aggregated stream by fk, where the subscript
k denotes the total number of streams involved in
forming the aggregate flow.
Given that each interactive stream is independent
of all the other streams, the probability of having a
period of length T with no arrivals in the flow fk
is given by:
P{Nfk(ta + ℓ)−Nfk(ta) = 0} =
k∏
i=1
Pfi(0; ℓ)
= Pfm(0; ℓ)
k (6)
Equation (6) shows that probability of having pe-
riod of length ℓ with no arrivals decreases exponen-
tially in k, the total number of copies used to form
the aggregate flow fk. Therefore, if the streams are
not watermarked there is a very small probability
that the aggregate stream has periods of no arrivals.
However, if ICBW or IBW use the same key and
message across all interactive flows, the aggregated
copy of the watermarked flows always exhibits
patterns of no arrivals of length ℓ that give away the
location of the watermark as well as the maximum
delay parameter a of ICBW and the the period T
of IBW.
Substituting the parameters of (5) into (4), assum-
ing ℓ = 350ms, as suggested by Wang et al. [7],
we have Pfm(0; 0.35) = 0.33. Therefore, in an
aggregate of as few as 10 flows probability of a
periods of 350ms without any arrivals is as low as
Pfm(0; 0.35)
10 = 1.6×10−5. Similarly for ℓ = 900ms,
as used by Pyun et al. [6], we have Pfm(0; 0.9) =
0.17 and Pfm(0; 0.9)
10 = 2.4× 10−8.
This, of course, shows us the probability of find-
ing an empty interval in a particular spot; we next
consider the possibility of finding empty intervals
at any position in the flows. To do so, we use a
discrete approximation. Given an aggregate flow of
length L, we are interested in finding the probabil-
ity of having an empty interval of length ℓ at any
position. For this, we divide the aggregate flow into
non-overlapping intervals with length ℓM = ℓ/M
(a total of N = ⌊L/ℓM⌋ intervals). Finding M (or
M − 1) consecutive empty intervals of length ℓM
gives lowerbound (upperbound) of this probability.
Since P00 = 0.96, the process is nearly memory-
less and we can approximate the discrete version
of the problem as a Bernoulli process, where each
interval is empty with probability pM = Pfk(0;LM ).
For a total of n intervals let us refer to the proba-
bility of finding s consecutive empty intervals as
PE(s, pM , n). We can compute this using a recur-
rence.2 Let y[n] = PE(s, pM , n)
c, i.e., the probability
of finding no consecutive runs of s empty intervals
among the first n intervals. Then, for n ≥ s, we
have:
2. This solution is adapted from [26].
8y[n] = y[n− 1]− (1− pM )p
s
M · y[n− s− 1]
This is because the probability of having no runs
of s empty intervals among n is the probability that
there aren’t any empty intervals among the first n−
1, less the probability that there is exactly one run
among the last s intervals. This recurrence has the
characteristic polynomial:
p(x) = xs+1 − xs + (1− pM )p
s
M
Any solution to the recurrence can be expressed
in terms of the roots of the polynomial p(x); given
roots ri with respective multiplicities mi, we have
that:
y[n] =
∑
i
pi(n)r
n
i
where pi is a polynomial of degree at most mi − 1.
(See, for example, [27, Theorem 4.5.6].) Note that
y[n] = 1 for n < s, which allows us to solve for the
coefficients of the polynomials. Finally, we compute
PE(s, pM , n) = 1− y[n].
Note that the schemes above will create multiple
blank intervals, so we compute the probability of
finding e blank intervals of length ℓ in a flow
of length L, P ′E(L, ℓ, e). Modeling the process as
approximately memoryless, we can see that, for
e > 1 and L > ℓ:
P ′E(L, ℓ, e) = P
′
E(L, ℓ, 1)P
′
E(L − ℓ, ℓ, e− 1)
Therefore:
P ′E(L, ℓ, e) =
{∏e−1
i=0 P
′
E(L − iℓ, ℓ, 1) L ≥ eℓ
0 otherwise
where P
′
E(L − iℓ, ℓ, 1) is approximated by the
method above, i.e.,
PE(M − 1, pM , ⌊(L− iℓ)/ℓM⌋) ≤ P
′
E(L− iℓ, ℓ, 1) ≤
PE(M,pM , ⌊(L− iℓ)/ℓM⌋)
We apply these computations to parameters,
taken from the evaluation of the ICBW scheme
by Wang et al. [7]. They used a 32-bit watermark,
with a redundancy between 12 and 20, and flow
lengths between 394 and 650 seconds. In Figure 6,
we plot PE′(394 s, 350ms, 12 × 32) as a function of
the number of aggregated flows. We can see that,
even for small numbers of flows, the false-positive
probability of our attack is quite low. This graph
was computed using M = 40, which is sufficient
to give an approximate error of less than 10−45
for k > 4, computed by comparing the upper and
lower bounds.
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Fig. 6. False positive errors of MFA for different
number of aggregated flows.
3.4 Impact of Timing Perturbations
Our analysis above assumed that the the attacker
sees the timings of the watermarked stream directly.
In reality, these timings will be perturbed by net-
work delays. As a result, the intervals cleared by the
watermark may have some packets from previous
intervals shifted into them and no longer appear
completely empty. Note that what is relevant here is
not the magnitude of the network delay but its vari-
ance, or jitter, since delaying all packets by an equal
amount does not affect our attack. And if the jitter
is much less than ℓ, our attack will work equally
well: if jitter is < ǫ with high probability, then
we will find clear intervals of length at least ℓ − ǫ
in the k averaged watermarked streams, whereas
the probability of seeing such an interval in unwa-
termarked streams is Pfm(0; ℓ − ǫ)
k ≈ Pfm(0; ℓ)
k,
which is vanishingly small. We observe that the
studied parameters of the ICBW and IBW schemes
have ℓ = 350ms or 900ms, in order to resist traffic
perturbations, repacketization, etc. The network jit-
ter, on the other hand, is two orders of magnitude
smaller. Our experiments on PlanetLab [28] show
it to be on the order of several milliseconds for
geographically distributed hosts, and this matches
the results of previous studies [29]. Therefore, it is
indeed the case that the jitter is < ǫ≪ ℓ, and so it
will not significantly affect our attack.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Having shown the theoretical background behind
our attack, we now show the result of implement-
ing it in practice. We developed algorithms to detect
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Fig. 7. 10 flows before and after watermarking.
the presence of a watermark, recover the secret
parameters, and to remove the watermark from
new streams. We evaluated the algorithms using
both real flows gathered from traces and synthetic
flows generated using our MMPP model, presented
in Section 3.1. We first present our attacks for same-
value watermarks, and then extend it to multi-
valued watermarks.
4.1 Watermark Detection
As above, our attack relies on collecting a series of
flows that are watermarked with the same value.
These flows are combined into a single flow and ex-
amined for large gaps between packets. Figure 7(a)
shows the packet arrivals for 10 combined flows
before and after an ICBW watermark has been
applied. The watermark pattern is clearly visible
in the combined flows, alerting about the water-
mark presence. Figure 7(b) shows the same process
working with the IBW watermark scheme.
We also performed the same analysis for non-
interactive, bulk transfer traffic by applying the
watermark to packet traces we collected from web
downloads across a DSL connection. Figure 8(a)
shows the packet timings for 10 combined flows
before and after a watermark. Bulk transfers have
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Fig. 8. Watermark detection on bulk traffic.
a somewhat more regular behavior, since they are
controlled by the TCP algorithms, rather than by
individual users. This can be seen at the beginning
of the 10 combined flows before watermark: the
TCP slow start period results in a much lower
rates for the first few seconds of the connection.
However, this regularity quickly gets out of sync
due to irregular network delay and response times.
In the graph of 10 watermarked flows, the intervals
squeezed by the watermark are readily visible. In
fact, because data transfer flows are much more
dense than interactive flows, the watermark is vis-
ible even on a single flow (Figure 8(b)).
The DSSS watermark is intended to be applied
to bulk transfer traffic such as FTP, since it inter-
feres with traffic rate, rather than changing packet
timings. A similar muiti-flow attack works against
DSSS as well, as shown in Figure 9. (We used
the parameters of chip length 0.4s, chip sequence
length of 7, and code length of 7.) In this case,
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Fig. 9. Average rate of 10 flows after DSSS water-
mark.
periods of high interference are clearly seen as low-
rate periods in the flows, allowing one to recover
the chip sequence and then decode the watermark.
4.2 Watermark Removal
Based on the combined graphs, it is easy to recover
the watermark parameters as well. We can build a
template of clear intervals by selecting all intervals
larger than a threshold; for example, Figure 10(a)
shows the template derived from 10 flows wa-
termarked by ICBW. The estimated template is
somewhat imprecise, due to network jitter, as well
as the fact that small (10–20ms) gaps may precede
or follow the clear intervals even when 10 flows
are combined. However, this imprecision is not a
problem since the watermark can still be effectively
removed. The template also lets us estimate the
values of T and a. We can average the lengths of
clear intervals and the distance between two con-
secutive clear intervals to obtain a relatively precise
estimate. Armed with this information, we can then
modify a new flow to remove the watermark.
For ICBW, we have two choices: we can either
shift traffic into the clear intervals in the template,
thereby negating the squeezing action of the water-
mark, or find intervals that have not been squeezed
and squeeze them. We decided to implement the
former approach since it does not require as precise
an estimate of T . Also, it leaves the flow looking
more natural. Our shift is implemented as shown
in Figure 10(b), by shifting all packets in a period
α before the clear interval into an interval of length
β inside the clear interval. Larger values of α and
smaller values of β will more significantly shift
the interval centroid back in a different direction;
however, very small values of β may not have the
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Fig. 10. Watermark Removal
desired effect, since the template is imprecise and
too many packets may get shifted without arriving
into the correct interval. Experimentally, we found
that α = 0.9(Tˆ − aˆ) and β = 0.8(Tˆ − aˆ) provides
best results, where Tˆ and aˆ are estimated values of
T and a.
Table 1 shows the results of watermark removal.
We reimplemented the ICBW detection mechanism
and computed the Hamming distance of the en-
coded watermark to the detected one, collected
over 100 flows. (We show the average distance,
with range shown in parentheses). With as few as
10 flows, we are able to get a reasonably good
estimate of T and a and remove the watermark
in most cases—the ICBW detection scheme uses a
Hamming distance threshold of 5–8 to decide when
a watermark has been detected. With 15 flows, we
get a more accurate template and estimate, and all
100 flows will clear the template.
A similar approach can be used to attack the IBW
watermark; by delaying packets so that they fall
into the clear intervals, the clear intervals become
indistinguishable from loaded ones. Table 2 shows
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TABLE 1
Results for removing ICBW watermarks
Num Tˆ aˆ Hamming Hamming Hamming Ave. Max
flows not watermarked watermarked attacked delay delay
10 365 492 17.9 2.67 13.9 33.6 164
(σ = 10.7) (σ = 15.2) (13–24) (1–7) (2–20)
15 353 504 17.6 2.74 16.1 42.6 188.2
(σ = 0.60) (σ = 1.62) (13–25) (0–6) (12–21)
20 346 504 17.2 2.68 16.4 45.4 194.3
(σ = 0.30) (σ = 0.50) (12–21) (0–5) (11–20)
the effect of applying our attack on the IBW water-
mark, where 24 bits are encoded at different levels
of redundancy. Even with a redundancy of 80, most
bits are not recovered correctly. These results were
obtained by using the code provided by the authors
of [6].
We expect a similar technique should work
against DSSS watermarks; a template of low rates
can be inferred from several flows. An attacker can
then decrease rates in the non-interference section
of the template by dropping packets, or increase
the rate in the high-interference section by delay-
ing packets into the template. We do not have
experimental results for DSSS since the detection
algorithm is fairly complex and we did not have
access to an implementation of it.
4.3 Multiple Values
So far we have assumed that the watermarks on
all of the aggregated flows are the same. Here,
we consider the case where each watermark uses
multiple, different values. We can still execute our
attack by relying on the fact that within a collection
of 2k − 1 flows, for any given bit b, we can find k
flows where this bit has the same value (we have
further discussed this in [11] and [30]).
Figure 11(a) plots the result of such a subset
search. By inspection, we can see that in the first
subset of flows, the interval (4.5,4.85) has been
cleared. In the second subset, this interval remains
cleared and the interval (0,0.35) becomes clear as
well. The third subset has no packets in (2.0,2.35)
and the fourth in (3.5,3.85). Note that this pattern
immediately lets us detect the presence of a water-
mark; Figure 11(b) shows the same flow subsets on
an unwatermarked section.
Recovery of the secret parameters can proceed
largely as in the single-value case. One difficulty is
that with the flow subsets, we may encounter large
intervals that are not precisely aligned with the
TABLE 2
Watermark bits detected before and after applying
the attack (watermark length is 24).
Rep. Bits detected Marked
Before attack After attack packets
1 7 3 53
5 14 5 156
10 24 4 505
15 24 2 754
20 24 2 967
24 24 2 1209
30 24 2 1440
35 24 2 1724
41 24 2 2008
45 24 2 2307
50 24 2 2697
55 24 2 3083
60 24 2 3296
65 24 2 3623
70 24 2 3876
75 24 2 4090
80 24 2 4343
interval positions. For example, Table 3(a) lists the
blank intervals longer than 0.2s in the last subset.
There are a lot of wrong-size intervals that result
from the case when 8 or 9 of the flows in the subset
have had an interval squeezed, but the last one or
two add a few packets to the mix. To address this
concern, we can select the largest empty intervals
in any subset, as shown in Table 3(b). These will
correspond to intervals that have been squeezed
on every flow. This can be used to recover the
watermark parameters of T and a.
Once these are obtained, the next step is to scan
through all subsets and determine which intervals
are always squeezed at the same time and call such
lists Si; these will correspond to either Ab or Bb for
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some bit b. Then, for each Si, we find Sj such that
Si and Sj are never squeezed at the same time. This
will tell us that Si and Sj correspond to the same
bit. Armed with this knowledge, we can remove the
watermark by observing the watermarked stream
for a short while, and when we see intervals from
Si that are being squeezed, we proceed to artifi-
cially squeeze intervals in Sj (or unsqueeze further
intervals in Si, or both).
5 COUNTERMEASURES
We next consider several countermeasures to our
attack.
5.1 Multiple Offsets
A watermark can be inserted at an offset o from
the start of the stream. This offset is picked ran-
domly from the range [0, omax]; [6] suggested to use
omax = T . An offset watermark can still be detected
by enumerating different offsets and choosing the
one with the highest detection result. This will
increase the false positives, in proportion to omax,
but overall [6] reports that such a scheme still has
good performance.
Since an offset is chosen randomly for each
stream, it complicates the multi-flow attack because
the watermark insertion points no longer line up
TABLE 3
Blank intervals from subset of flows
(a) All blank inter-
vals
Start End
2.08 2.32
3.50 3.85
4.03 4.25
5.13 5.33
11.59 11.85
18.14 18.37
19.56 19.79
25.58 25.82
30.06 30.34
34.08 34.35
... ...
(b) Largest blank inter-
vals
Start End
130.98 131.35
140.49 140.86
151.99 152.36
161.99 162.35
235.99 236.37
306.49 306.86
334.49 334.86
368.49 368.86
43.99 44.36
51.98 52.35
... ...
with one another. It becomes necessary to search
for optimal alignments by trying multiple offsets
for different streams. A simple approach is to se-
lect a step value δ and choose offset values from:
(0, δ, 2δ, ..., ⌈omax/δ⌉δ). The attacker will need to
enumerate through each of these values for each
stream out of k, evaluating (⌈omax/δ⌉+ 1)
k
possi-
bilities in all.3
Each target alignment might be imperfect, but it
is easy to see that, for some choice of offset for
each stream, the misalignment will be bounded by
δ/2. Therefore, we must search for clear intervals
of length ℓ = T − δ/2. We can therefore bound the
probability of false positives in the overall process
by:
PFP ≤
(⌈omax
δ
⌉
+ 1
)k
P
′
E(L, ℓ, e) (7)
where L is the maximum length of the streams
and e is number of required empty intervals for
watermark detection (P
′
E(L, ℓ, e) is analyzed in Sec-
tion 3.3).
Figure 11 illustrates the corresponding false posi-
tive error rate for different number of flows k when
the maximum offset value is omax = 10T and the
step value is δ = T . Comparing with using only a
single offset (Figure 6), we can see that the multi-
flow attack is still effective, at the cost of more
computation for the attacker and requiring more
3. The computational requirements can be reduced by elimi-
nating from consideration any combinations that can be shown
to lack the necessary clear intervals in a subset of all streams.
E.g, if the first two streams have no intersecting clear intervals
that are long enough with offsets (0, 0), it is not necessary to
consider combinations with other stream at offsets (0, 0, . . .).
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Fig. 11. False positive errors of MFA for different
number of aggregated flows when multiple offsets
are used (omax = 10T , δ = T ).
(approximately twice) watermarked flows for the
same performance. It should also be mentioned
that this also increases the false positive of the
watermark detector by a factor of omax/δ = 10.
Note that larger omax increases the attacker’s false
positive and also the computation, but requires
longer flows to insert the watermark.
5.2 Multiple Positions
Another alternative is to choose different positions,
in the case of ICBW and IBW, and different PN
codes in the case of DSSS [30]. Let us consider the
case of ICBW. A watermarker and detector must
use the same assignment of intervals to the sets
Ai and Bi, as determined by the random seed
s, in order for the watermark to be successfully
recovered. However, a watermarker may decide to
use multiple seed values, s1, . . . , sn, and pick one
of them at random for each flow.
To deal with this, the detector would need to try
to recover the watermark with each possible si and
pick the best match. Once again, the probability of
error grows with n, but increased redundancy can
again be used to make up for it. Note that the prob-
ability of error falls exponentially with increased
redundancy, but grows only roughly linearly with
n.
We can once again use the subset attack to try
to find k flows that use the same seed value
si; however, the complexity grows quickly out of
control. The probability of a given set of k flows
using the same seed is
(
1
n
)k−1
, which falls quite
quickly even when k = 10. By the pigeon hole
principle, within n(k − 1) + 1 flows we can always
find a subset of k flows with the same seed, but
the search space of all
(
n(k−1)+1
k
)
subsets grows
superexponentially in n. For example, with n = 6
and k = 10,
(
51
10
)
> 1010, resulting in an infeasible
number of subsets to enumerate.
The same principle can apply to IBW, by picking
multiple sets of positions {si}, and to DSSS by
using multiple PN codes [21].
6 CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated an attack on three recent
network flow watermarking schemes that is highly
successful, while requiring a low amount of re-
sources. Our attack, MFA, is based on a solid
theoretical grounding, and has been validated with
a prototype implementation tested against the orig-
inal prototypes. MFA can detect the presence of the
watermark on a watermarked flow and remove it
successfully. Additionally, in case of IBW scheme
we can also recover the watermark parameters and
values, allowing us to modify the watermark or
insert it into other streams, confusing the detector.
We have also suggested two countermeasures to
our attack — switching bit positions and using
different offset values. These countermeasures can
impose a very high computation cost and therefore
disable the attack.
While the use of network flow watermarking
techniques for various security applications is quite
new [4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], digital watermark-
ing and specifically multimedia watermarking is a
nearly mature field. Indeed most of network flow
watermarking schemes are inspired by multimedia
watermarks. To name a few Wang and Reeves’s [4]
scheme is a special instance of QIM watermarking,
a well-understood multimedia watermarking tech-
nique [31]. IBW scheme of Pyun et al. [6] that we
have broken is based on patchwork watermark of
Bender et al. [32] and the scheme of Yu et al. [8] is
based on spread spectrum watermarking [33].
The current approach for designing network flow
watermarks suffers from the fact that while wa-
termarking schemes are inspired by the digital
watermarking schemes, little attention is given to
the entirety of the watermarking design problem.
For example, statistical characteristics of the under-
lying media are always an important consideration
in digital watermarks, but network watermark re-
search does not adequately model the effect that
network traffic characteristics have on watermarks;
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as we showed, the density of bulk traffic makes
it very difficult to insert a transparent watermark.
Likewise, digital watermarks have long considered
the possibility that multiple watermarked docu-
ments can be used to attack watermarks [33], [34],
but we are unaware of previous work looking at
the multi-flow threat model for watermarking. We
thus hope that future work on watermarks will
be informed by our work and perform a broader
analysis.
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